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The ‘Dominant Party Debate’ in South Africa  
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The persistence of the debate about whether the African National Congress 
(ANC) can or should be characterized as a „dominant party” was illus-
trated by exchanges between the country’s leading political parties during 
the 2004 general election. The ANC, which views its hegemony as express-
ing its popularity, rejects its depiction as a ‘dominant party’ as  inherently 
hostile, conservative and racist. In contrast, the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
and its associated analysts warn against dangers posed to democracy by 
the ANC’s arrogance, freedom from accountability, and its ambitions to ex-
tend increasing control over the state and society. After a review of the cen-
tral tenets of the debate, the present article suggests that both sets of an-
tagonists exaggerate their case. In contrast, whilst accepting that the ANC’s 
electoral and political hegemony does carry threats to democracy, it also 
proposes that the ability of the ANC to extend its dominance is subject to 
considerable limitations. This argument is pursued through analysis of 
such factors as the multidimensionality of party dominance, the extent to 
which the ANC’s attempted centralization of power is constrained by con-
stitutional, political and economic realities, the perpetuation of debate 
within the ANC and between itself and its principal allied organizations, 
and finally the difficulties faced by the ANC in imposing its authority upon 
a society as complex as that of South Africa. The conclusion argues that the 
dominant party thesis, whilst too often exaggerated, is too important and 
insightful to be abandoned, and that careful analysis suggests that the basis 
of ANC dominance is far from static, and is likely to be subjected to consid-
erable challenge over coming years. 
 
 
Keywords 
 
South Africa, political parties, hegemonic systems, African National Congress, 
Democratic Alliance (South Africa), political power, elections/voting, transition 
between political systems, academic dialogue 
 
 
he „dominant party” debate in South Africa just won’t go away! Indeed, 
in the lead up to the 2004 general elections, it became a major focus of 
public attention, for there was a universal expectation that the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC) would secure a repeat massive victory at the polls. 
T 
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In the event, this was to be more than realized in practice. At the „liberation 
elections” of 1994 it had received 62.65% of the vote for the national parlia-
ment; and in 1999 it increased its majority to 66.35%. Now, in 2004, it was to 
secure fully 69.68% of the vote, as well as winning control of the two prov-
inces out of the nine created in 1994 which had hitherto escaped its control. 
For the most prominent exponent of the „party dominance” theory in South 
Africa, Professor Herman Giliomee, this was merely to reinforce concerns that 
the very essence of democracy in South Africa was at risk (Giliomee 2004). 
 Giliomee – with different associates – had been primarily responsible for 
articulating the theory of party dominance with particular regard to the ANC 
within the academy following the earlier elections (Giliomee & Simkins 1999; 
Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer 2001). During the 2004 election campaign 
it was to be taken up by the principal opposition party, the Democratic Alli-
ance (DA), which repeated previous warnings about the dangers of ANC 
dominance, viewed as overweaning arrogance and freedom from accountabil-
ity. Having warned of the dangers of the ANC securing a two-thirds majority 
in the 1999 election, which would enable it to change the constitution unas-
sisted by support from any other party, DA leader Tony Leon now demanded 
assurance from ANC leader Thabo Mbeki that he would not change the rules 
in the coming parliament to enable himself to run for a hitherto constitution-
ally-forbidden third term as President.  
 The ANC response, penned in part by President Mbeki himself (Mbeki 
2004), was that the concept of party dominance was inherently conservative, 
and that even where it was not deployed directly in the interests of the DA, it 
served as a cover for white interests which have an inherent distrust of black 
governance, and which were suggesting, at base, that the ANC was „anti-
democratic”. Insistence upon „the necessity of a potential changeover of 
power in the foreseeable future (as) a basic test of whether (South Africa is) a 
democracy” was not argument, but dogma. The ANC-led government was 
not only subject in its actions to a range of constitutional constraints but was 
also bringing changes for the better to ordinary people’s lives. The majority of 
South Africans wanted a common society and a unifying mode of politics 
rather than the racial divisiveness peddled by the DA (Suttner 2004a).  
 I would argue that the persistence of the ‘Dominant Party Debate’ indi-
cates its continuing centrality to our understanding of the dynamics and 
prospects of democracy in SA. However, I would also like to propose that the 
debate has become somewhat static, and that we now need to concentrate our 
attention as much on how politics in SA may be changing as on how it is stay-
ing the same. 
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Defining party dominance 
 
The idea of the ANC as a dominant party starts from the obvious fact of its 
overwhelming popular majority, and its apparent invincibility at the polls (at 
least in the immediate post-apartheid era). Basing themselves on the classic 
statement of Pempel (1990), Giliomee and Simkins (1999) define dominant par-
ties as those which: 
 
•   Establish electoral dominance for an uninterrupted and prolonged period; 
 
•   Enjoy dominance in the formation of governments; 
 
•  Enjoy dominance in determining public agenda, notably with regard to 
pursuit of a „historical project”. 
 
They argue that there is a fundamental tension between dominant party rule and 
democracy, and that whereas party dominance can pave the way to competitive 
democracy, in others it can lead to façade democracy or barely concealed au-
thoritarianism. 
 Pempel’s notion of party dominance is based primarily on European 
experience. It is also important to note that it is addressing a particular kind of 
democratic party system. Parties may dominate, partly by bending electoral 
rules, but ultimately the notion admits that they are re-elected because an 
electorate wants them re-elected. It clearly follows from this perspective that 
the Swedish social democrats were a dominant party, but the NSDAP in Nazi-
Germany was not, for itrode roughshod over the constitution and rendered 
the political system wholly undemocratic, completely nullifying the electoral 
system. How far dominant parties may bend rules and manipulate systems 
without wholly subverting democracy is clearly a matter for debate: democ-
racy” after all is often measured on something of a sliding scale. But the fun-
damental distinction between party dominance secured by popular endorse-
ment and non-democratic, authoritarian or fascist rule remains. 
 Giliomee and Simkins accept this distinction but go on to argue that 
dominant parties in semi-industrialised countries, such as South Africa are 
more likely to abuse power than those in the industrialized countries studied 
by Pempel. This is basically because in less advanced and more unequal 
(semi-industrialised) countries a capitalist state has difficulty in establishing 
real autonomy from capitalist interests on which it is dependent for invest-
ment decisions. 
 This provides the springboard for analysis of SA under the ANC as a 
dominant party state. 
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The ‘Dominant Party Debate’ in SA 
 
Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer (2004) argue that post-1994 South Africa is 
characterized by: 
 
•   A lack of uncertainty about electoral outcomes. South African elections 
take on the characteristic of a „racial census”, which is admitted to be a com-
plex, not a crude phenomenon, requiring disaggregation. Opposition there-
fore becomes peripheralised. 
 
•   A highly centralized and hierarchical state, which the ANC has inherited 
from the NP. This means minorities are barely protected, the neutrality of the 
civil service is subverted, and the autonomy of independent bodies like the 
South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) is eroded. 
 
•   The delegitimisation of significant opposition, which is presented as op-
posed to „transformation”, at the same time as the ANC is extending party 
control over the state. 
 
•   The (post-Leninist) centralization of power within the ruling party, leading 
to the circumscription of internal party democracy. 
 
South Africa, they conclude, „has achieved majority legitimacy but at the cost of 
minority alienation” (ibid 180). Majoritarianism has triumphed over consocia-
tionalism and checks and balances.  
 Many of these arguments are echoed by the DA. For instance, Selfe (2004) 
has proposed: 
 
•   Prolonged and unchallenged concentration of power leads to the abuse of 
power. 
 
•   The presence of opposition parties as „alternative governments” is the best 
means of keeping governments honest. 
 
•   Where as  in  South Africa one party holds an overwhelming majority and 
the possibility of change is null and void, the ruling party no longer has to 
account for its failures and the slide to a one-party state begins. 
 
•   Party dominance, which undermines parliament,  renders the ruling party 
unaccountable. 
 
Writing in the heat of the recent election campaign, Selfe went on to express 
confidence that South Africa will not remain a one-party dominant state for very 
much longer, and that there will be a day when the ANC loses power and be-
comes an opposition. Yet the very logic of the argument, which he is presenting, 
actually undermines this rhetorical optimism, and the conclusion,  often drawn 
from this sort of analysis, is that South Africa is on the road to becoming another 
 
The „Dominant Party Debate” in South Africa 
 
 
65
 
Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, it is important to note that, although left-wing critics of 
the ANC do not utilize the framework of the „dominant party” thesis directly, 
they nonetheless endorse many of its central elements, with Dale McKinley, an 
activist who was expelled from the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 
2000, arguing initially that the ANC and SACP hierarchies (which are formally 
linked together with the Congress of South African Trade Unions in the Tripar-
tite Alliance) had clamped down on internal party and internal Alliance debate 
(McKinley 2001) and latterly, upon popular political protest (McKinley 2004). 
 
In contrast to the above, critics of the dominant party thesis argue that: 
 
•  Those who argue the dominant party thesis have a fundamental objection 
to what has been democratically decided. This often shades into racism. 
 
•  Electoral dominance does not mean that South Africa is undemocratic. 
Those opposed to the government have the constitutional right and actual 
freedom to vote for the opposition. 
 
•  The necessity of a potential  changeover of power in the foreseeable  future  
cannot be a basic test of democracy. The ANC cannot be blamed for its own 
popularity. 
 
•  The rule of the ANC is checked by a range of constitutional institutions 
which support democracy and often expose corruption and record decisions 
that  go against the government. 
 
•  Continued harping by the opposition upon the ANC as a dominant party, 
which undermines minority protections and interests works against the no-
tion of a common South African nationhood (Maloka 2001; Suttner 2004). 
 
My argument is that whilst the dominant party theorists tend to overstate 
their case, their critics similarly overstate theirs and furthermore, overlook the 
complexities and nuances of the „dominant party” argument. Nor does it help 
that the debate too readily becomes perjorative, and that „dominant party” 
theorists are too readily dismissed as motivated by racism. Now, although the 
DA has been often accused by commentators  of at times pressing buttons 
which send out identifiably subterranean racist messages, just as in response, 
the ANC is regularly deemed to be playing a „race card” of its own (Mare 
2001), it is important to distinguish between the intellectual structure and 
coherence of the dominant party argument (of which racism has no part) and 
how the dominant party argument may be used (or rather, mis-used). The 
concern here is with the former, rather than the latter. In short, it is proposed 
here that the party dominance idea does have a lot to say about South Africa, 
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it is suggestive about the nature of South African democracy, and that hence 
the baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater. 
 
As proposed elsewhere (Southall 2004): 
 
•  A  „weak”  version of the  dominant party thesis is much more productive 
and multidimensional than theorists such as Giliomee et al allow. 
 
•  This recognizes that for reasons of history the ANC enjoys a ‘natural’ ma-
jority, and that it is democratically elected. 
 
•  It acknowledges that the ANC has embarked upon a considerable 
centralization of power  and has blurred boundaries between the party and the 
state, but argues that in doing so it has encountered significant limits. 
 
•  The drive to centralize power in party flows at least in part from the com-
mendable desires of imposing fiscal discipline, driving development and curb-
ing corruption.  In other words, the ANC is at least in its own vision engaged in 
a process of modernising the state. 
 
•  The ANC is a „broad church” and as such is the site of struggle between a 
variety of ideological persuasions and political practices. Countercurrents of 
democratic centralism and participatory democracy coexist. Hence we find that 
vigorous (often vicious) debates and scraps take place between different compo-
nents of the Tripartite Alliance. 
 
•  Even if the ANC has the intention to dominate the state, in practice it does 
not have  the capacity to  impose itself  upon society.  Even the apartheid state 
failed to do this, and failed to contain mass discontent.  
 
My argument here is that in order to move towards a more nuanced and use-
ful understanding of a changing party system we need to elaborate upon 
these various features of South Africa as a „weak dominant party state”. 
 
 
„Weak” party dominance in South Africa 
 
An interpretation, which views the dominance of the ANC as „weak”, or quali-
fied by factors beyond its control, accepts many of Giliomee’s and Simkins’ 
premises. In summary, it recognises the tension between party dominance and 
democracy. It recognizes the dangers to accountability posed by a party which 
can dominate parliament and which has the power to change (or just under-
mine) the constitution. It recognises the dangers posed by a party which has 
power to erode the independence of other institutions. Furthermore, it recog-
nises the dangers of a party which can wield its financial powers to establish 
networks of patronage at national, provincial and local government levels. How-
ever, it also recognizes that the power of the ANC to impose itself upon the state 
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and upon society is also subject to considerable limitations (including its own 
democratic and liberatory traditions). Let us now explore how aspects of these 
pressures and counter-pressures play themselves out. 
 
 
The multidimensionality of party dominance 
 
One of the key fears which  lie behind the notion of the ANC as a dominant 
party is that it will follow the examples of other African nationalist and libera-
tion movements in moving to „de jure” or „de facto” one-partyism. Indeed, I 
have myself argued that there is an inherent logic to the nature of a national 
liberation struggle which results in authoritarianism, and that „once having 
attained national independence, the inexorable logic of national liberation 
seems to be to suppress rather than to liberate democracy” (Southall 2003a: 
256). I argue this on the basis of a case-study of post-liberation, post-apartheid 
developments in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa which proposes that:  
 
•  In their drive to liberate  countries from  colonial and/ or apartheid rule, na-
tional liberation movements (NLMs) are driven to create nations and to deny  or 
suppress cultural and historical diversities amongst those who have been op-
pressed. To overcome the risks or reality of tribalisms or difference, there is a 
perceived need to maintain a notion of monolithic national unity. 
 
•  The armed struggles waged by  NLMs  in southern Africa were directed at 
wresting state power from colonial and/or settler control. The capture of state 
power was followed by the construction of dominant party states wherein 
control of state machinery was utilized to delegitimise opposition, denounce 
minorities who mobilize on issues vital to them, and to erect a „culture of 
entitlement” to state resources for the new power-holders. 
 
•  In any former settler colony, continuing racial inequities in ownership skewed 
in favour of a white minority are perpetually available as a cause for political 
mobilization, allowing the new-powerholders to mobilize around historic racial 
rather than newly emerging class-divisions. 
 
However, whilst exploring how these tendencies have worked themselves out 
in all three countries I also consider how the liberal democratic model, which 
has been touted as their antidote has itself promoted elitism and acute societal 
inequalities of power and wealth (despite being a necessary dimension of any 
progression to a genuine liberation). I also indicate that many of the worst 
aspects of authoritarianism have been ameliorated in South Africa by such 
phenomena as the non-racial tradition of the ANC. An optimistic interpreta-
tion of the ANC’s status as a dominant party, I suggest, is that: 
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It is the very complexity of the South African situation and the fact that the 
democratic settlement was based upon the agreement to co-exist and cooper-
ate of countervailing forces which could not defeat each other, that will work 
to constrain the more authoritarian values and practices of the ANC in power 
(Southall 2003a: 262). 
 At the base of such argumentation, is a set of reasons as to why South 
Africa, although sharing some considerable structural and political-cultural 
similarities, is unlikely to become „another Zimbabwe”, that is, a „failed 
state” characterized by brutal authoritarianism, societal decay and stagnant or 
negative economic growth. 
 The ANC’s sensitivity to the „dominant party” thesis is undoubtedly 
fueled by an acute defensiveness about the broader African record. The 
deeply authoritarian nature of most post-independence regimes is intellectu-
ally recognized as expressed notably by President Mbeki’s stress upon the 
necessity of „good governance” as a major plank of  the New Partnership for 
African Development (NEPAD). Yet emotional acceptance of authoritarianism 
as the norm is much more difficult, precisely because it conjures up deeply 
worrying suggestions that there is something inherent in the African situation 
which produces it. Denial of the deeply unpleasant reality is therefore readily 
combined with understandable post-colonial umbrage at suggestions of Afri-
can inequality or „unreadiness” for democracy. Hence willingness to defend 
present-day Zimbabwe as embodying „democracy”, albeit challenged by the 
strains of confronting post-colonial racial inequalities, is matched by insis-
tence that developments taking place in that country will not repeat them-
selves in South Africa. The need to „defend Africa” is simultaneous with the 
need for South Africa to differentiate itself from it. Yet it is precisely the latter 
aspect of this contradiction, which helps us to understand why party domi-
nance in South Africa is unlikely to transform into „one partyism”. 
 
One-party states were established in African countries where: 
 
•  Triumphant  nationalist  parties were able to capture states which under 
colonialism had been neither constrained by independent institutions nor by 
civil society. 
  
•  The economy centred around the export of one or two primary commodi-
ties, and hence was easily available for  „capture and control” through na-
tionalization, state „partnerships” or taxation. 
 
The political economy of post-apartheid South African society is much more 
complicated. I would therefore propose, in contrast, that: 
 
•   South Africa is a constitutional state, where the government is at least 
notionally constrained by independent bodies such as the constitutional court 
and various „democracy promoting” commissions (the Human Rights Com-
mission, the Gender Commission, the Independent Electoral Commission and 
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so on). Suttner (2004b) propounds the ANC party-line when he argues that 
these protections are real. Against this, Giliomee and others argue that whilst 
the rights-based constitution adopted in 1994 and updated in 1996 is admira-
ble, it is failing in practice, and that the separation of powers and rights of 
minorities are being negated by the ANC’s capture of both the state and the 
„democracy promoting” commissions. For instance, the ANC is destroying 
the autonomy of watchdog committees in parliament at the same time as the 
Constitutional Court is increasingly shunned by minorities who believe that it 
regularly finds in favour of the majority party (Giliomee 2004). The latter 
position is probably the stronger one in that there is some considerable evi-
dence pointing to the undermining of the ability of standing committees to 
call the government to account (Calland 1999; Southall 2003b), even though 
no major studies of the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the „democracy-
promoting institutions” have yet entered the public domain. Nonetheless, this 
is a far cry from any suggestion that the constitution has become a cypher. 
The reality is much more contested, and individual rights are undoubtedly far 
more protected than they were under apartheid. Likewise, any erosion of 
minority rights (notably of Afrikaners, about whom Giliomee is particularly 
exercised) needs to be balanced against the collective rights, notably of the 
poor, which have been  considerably advanced under the constitution. 
 
•   There is a strong case for arguing that the independence of the SABC has 
been undermined since 1994. The recently appointed board has been widely 
accused of being stuffed with partisans of the ANC, and there were numerous 
criticisms during the recent election that the SABC gave saturation coverage 
to the ruling party at the direct expense of the opposition parties. Nonethe-
less, a recent study suggests that although the SABC’s role during the recent 
elections was controversial, the ANC was not disproportionately favoured by 
the state broadcaster, and if it „received the most coverage on both radio and 
television”, this reflected its being the largest party and the one which gener-
ated most news (Davis 2005). Meanwhile, awkward questions continue to be 
posed by investigative journalists, throughout the media (including the 
SABC, yet notably by those working for the weekly and weekend newspa-
pers). On the whole, the major press-groups are owned by large-scale capital, 
and are relatively even-handed, combining support with sharp criticism of the 
government. Certainly, the ANC regularly complains that its failings, whether 
of policy or concerning allegations of corruption, are the subject of too ful-
some and biased reporting (e.g. Turok 2004).  
 
•   The economy is semi-industrialised and dominated by large-scale corpora-
tions, many of which are transnationals, owing their allegiance to countries 
other than South Africa. There is an established (white) bourgeoisie which is 
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not immediately dependent on the state. Giliomee (2004) argues that although 
it is important for big business to play a counter-vailing role to government in 
the absence of an alternative government, the South African corporate sector 
has consistently failed to play such a role since 1924, when the Nationalists 
first took power. Instead, he argues, under both apartheid and the ANC, it has 
been wholly comfortable with one-party domination, with the large conglom-
erates principally interested in currying favour with the ruling party to obtain 
state contracts and concessions. However, what Giliomee fails to add is that, 
whilst the apartheid government was itself to be subject to belated pressure to 
amend its ways, and was to propelled towards negotiations with the ANC by 
the refusal of mainly American banks to roll over its international debts in 
1986, the ANC faces a situation where it is much more immediately subject to 
international investment sanction and veto. Since 1994, the economy has be-
come progressively more open as South Africa has sought to adjust and com-
pete in the rapidly globalising economy. The effort to secure foreign invest-
ment remains central to the government’s economic strategy, and certain 
South African conglomerates have been allowed to de-list from the country 
and to register overseas. It is not just, as Giliomee and others argue, that ef-
forts by the government to promote black economic empowerment by making 
heavy demands upon the corporate sector may automatically retard economic 
growth. It is also that corporate resistance and a new reluctance of foreign 
firms to invest may lead to the state moderating its strategy for BEE. The large 
conglomerates are unlikely to be actively democratic forces. However, in a 
globalising world, they may well work to prevent or dilute a concentration of 
power in a country, such as South Africa, which is competing with others for 
their investment. 
 As a result of the 1990s wave of democratization, African one-partyism 
has given way virtually everywhere to elections which are (more or less) 
competitive, and there has been a considerably greater „circulation of elites” 
than previously. Changes of government, from Nigeria to Kenya, by elections 
are becoming increasingly regularized, although many governments seek to 
bend electoral rules in the interests of survival. Yet it is only in a handful of 
southern African states (South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and 
possibly Lesotho) that the parties have become „dominant” in the sense that, 
even if (as in Namibia) they employ degrees of coercion to hang on to power, 
they retain a popular hegemony. This is surely their great strength – yet it is 
also their locus of potential vulnerability, for the structural limitations of their 
economies, which cannot support expanding populations, are almost bound 
to lead to an erosion of their popularity in the face of policy and „delivery” 
deficiencies. Party dominance may be real, yet in southern Africa it is very far 
from being a proto-monolithic phenomenon. 
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Centralization and the blurring of party and state 
 
There is a strong case for arguing that the ANC has embarked upon a centraliza-
tion of power, under a strong presidency. The ANC has sought to claw back 
much ground which it lost during the constitutional negotiations, and which 
notably, saw the establishment of the new provinces and a quasi-federalism. Yet 
under the ANC much effort has been exerted to prevent quasi-federalism be-
coming the real thing (Southall 2000). I  with the ANC having imposed, in prac-
tice, a highly centralized form of rule. The enormous financial control which the 
state wields from the centre, with the provinces being funded almost wholly 
(95%) from central budget, has been deliberately utilized to curb autonomy, 
which has been otherwise contained by maintenance of the simultaneity of pro-
vincial with national elections. Ths was completed by the machinery of „de-
ployment” whereby politicians are „deployed” from province to national institu-
tions (and the reverse), and to the civil service and other state institutions, even 
if, as Hawker (2004) has demonstrated, the ANC ability to manage deployment 
has by no means been absolute, and has had to make a number of compromises 
which have limited presidential/NEC prerogative. Federal tendencies have also 
been negated, within both the party and the state, by the President’s appoint-
ment of the premiers. Indeed, in the recent election, Mbeki declined to nominate 
the ANC’s candidates for the premierships in advance. This was manifestly to 
contain rivalries within the party during the campaign, but in the eyes of many, 
the decision advanced party interests at the expense of the rights of choice of the 
electorate. Mbeki’s subsequent appointment of eight new premiers after the 
election, whilst welcomed as replacing certain underperforming predecessors, 
was equally interpreted as the imposition of those who owed their loyalty di-
rectly to him rather than to provincial interests (Business Day, 22 April 2004; Sun-
day Times, 25 April 2004). 
 Giliomee, Myburg and Schlemmer (2001: 170) have argued that the list sys-
tem of voting has allowed „the party leadership to place loyalists in key posi-
tions, and at the same time compensate those who have lost out in internal 
power struggles through redeployment to comfortable but less strategic posts”. 
Their particular concern is that the independence of the state and civil service 
has been increasingly undermined by the appointment to leading positions of 
ANC loyalists, whose primary allegiance is to the party which appointed them. 
However, a detailed study of post-1994 „redeployments” by Hawker (2004) has 
demonstrated that this seriously exaggerates the reach of the party leadership. 
The ANC’s „deployment” strategy works at one level to make rational alloca-
tions of scarce, well trained and capable, human resources. Prior to the previous 
election, of the 60 members of the ANC’s National Executive Committee, 47 had 
been deployed to the National Assembly, 7 to party positions, and only 2 to 
diplomatic positions. Of the remainder, 3 had gone into business and 1 had not 
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been deployed. Meanwhile, of the sixty ANC MPs who had resigned from the 
National Assembly after their election in 1999, only 9 had moved to diplomatic 
positions or posts in the civil service. In contrast, 7 had moved to party positions, 
12 to become Ministers in the provinces, Mayors or members of the National 
Chamber of Provinces (the upper House of Parliament), 5 to business, and 1 to a 
civic body. 15 had made „stormy” or „managed” exits (i.e. they were not de-
ployed anywhere), and the destination of 4 other was unknown (although 
clearly not to any prominent position). Hawker (2004: 113) concludes that „the 
overweening power of the presidential executive, though asserted, has been less 
than absolute, and compromise as much as conflict and banishment has marked 
the passage of many members through the (National) Assembly”. 
 Of course, there is much more to the story than transfer to state positions of 
people who hold elected party office. Probably, more pervasive is the appoint-
ment of persons who are known to be sympathetic to the ANC to the civil ser-
vice, parastatals and supposedly politically neutral „organs of state”, such as the 
Democracy Promoting institutions and the boards of the SABC and government 
research agencies (such as  the Human Sciences Research Council). At one level, 
this is unexceptional in a country where majority sentiment, as expressed in 
successive elections, favours the ruling party. It is also reflective of post-1994 
affirmative recruitment, which has engaged in the reversal of past inequalities 
and the achievement of „representivity”. At this stage, however, it cannot be 
deemed an unqualified subordination of the state to party interests, unless mi-
nority interests and viewpoints are systematically excluded, but casual observa-
tion suggests that, on the whole, they are not. However, this is not to ignore the 
danger that the present situation may be beginning to replicate that under apart-
heid whereby, although public servants were constrained by law (from 1957) of 
participating in party politics, a tacit affirmative action policy represented a 
strategy of patronage for the National Party (Posel 2000: 55-56). However, ac-
cording to Naidoo (2004), the question of political influence on the contemporary 
public service remains undecided, and it is clear that he leans towards an inter-
pretation which views it, as under Mbeki, principally concerned with the effi-
cient conduct of its business.  
 The ANC sees itself as the vehicle of transformation of the political economy 
towards a goal of equity and growth. To this end, most particularly since 1999, it 
has embarked upon a project of black economic empowerment which has seen it 
attempt to promote black-owned corporations, a black capitalist class and black 
advance into the established (white) corporate sector in order to drive domestic, 
„patriotic” investment. The success of this enterprise has been highly uneven, 
and the private sector remains overwhelmingly dominated by whites. Nonethe-
less, a black presence in business is growing, and the financial rewards for those 
blacks who make a success of the corporate sector can be astonishing. The gov-
ernment has brought forth a panoply of measures, from legislation which re-
quires appropriate measures of „empowerment” for the award of official con-
tracts through to demands that the different industrial sectors come up with 
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„charters” that set empowerment targets to be achieved within a defined time-
span, which is designed to expand opportunities for an emergent black middle-
class dramatically. As a consequence, there is considerable evidence of a lurch 
towards „crony capitalism”, in which corporations, whether owned by blacks or 
whites, deem political connections necessary for their expansion (Southall 2004, 
2005). In this context, ANC politicians seem far more eager to go into business 
than into the civil service, and equally, senior civil servants seem keener to „re-
deploy” to the private sector than to step across into the cauldron of politics. In 
short, the blurring of party and state seems considerably less of a phenomenon 
in the present era than the politicization of business.  
 
 
Centralization as modernization? 
 
Inherent in much of the critique of the ANC as a dominant party is that the 
blurring of party and state entails a politicized appropriation of public re-
sources. Lying behind this is a sense of South Africa as increasingly ruled by a 
„nomenklatura”, a new class which accesses power, prosperity and privilege 
through membership and approval of the party. This fits easily into variant 
images of the ANC as replicating Soviet-style rule, African one-party kleptoc-
racies or South-East Asian-style crony capitalist regimes. None of these per-
spectives is complimentary, which is one reason why the ANC is so vehement 
in rejecting the model of „party dominance”. It argues, in contrast, that in so 
far as it is engaged in a project of centralization of state authority, this is in the 
cause of modernization and development.1  
 From the ANC’s perspective, its task since 1994 has been to create a mod-
ern, democratic state out of the backward-looking inheritance of apartheid. 
This entailed fashioning an efficient machinery of governance out of the 
amalgam of a racially-divided central authority and „self-governing” and 
juridically „independent” African „homelands”. NP rule since 1948 repre-
sented „forty lost years” (O’Meara 1996) during which patronage rather than 
technical competence had been the principal criterion for advance in the cen-
tral civil service, corruption had been endemic in the homelands, and deliber-
ate suppression of black educational and scientific advance had left an enor-
mous backlog of skills and capacity amongst the black majority. Whilst apart-
heid had overseen the creation of advanced infrastructure on behalf of whites, 
                                                 
1  The role of the ANC as a „modernising force” rather than as a „dominant party” was 
stressed by one of the party’s leading intellectuals, Firoz Cachalia, in his vigorous critique of 
my chapter on ‘The State of Party Politics’ at the launch of the HSRC’s first issue of a new 
series on The State of the Nation  (Daniel, Habib and Southall (2004)) in September 2005. 
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this was based upon the deliberate underdevelopment and degradation of the 
„black economy”. The ANC’s mission was consequently, not only the democ-
ratization of an inequitable, oppressive, ramshackle and largely inefficient 
state, but its total transformation. 
 During the negotiations process, the ANC had had to compromise its 
preference for a unitary state with the creation of the nine new provinces, 
which represented something of a devolution of power from the centre. How-
ever, once in power, the ANC has been determined to ensure that the prov-
inces, most of which have incorporated the former homelands, shall not be-
come obstacles to a common vision of identity, growth and development for 
the „new South Africa”. Nor, in particular, should they become regional 
chiefdoms through which party barons rule via corruption and patronage. It 
is to this end that Mbeki, as head of both party and state, has insisted upon 
the central appointment (and mid-term replacement if necessary) of provin-
cial premiers, and that from 1994 onwards, determined efforts have been 
made to prevent South Africa’s quasi-federalism becoming the real thing. 
Meanwhile, the ANC’s „deployment and redeployment” of human resources 
between national and provincial institutions encourages a unified vision of 
the state, as does the functioning of a single Public Service Commission and a 
common set of public service rules and regulations.  
 The ANC maintains (albeit more off than on the record) that the wisdom 
of its centralizing drive is demonstrated by the very real difficulties it has 
encountered in establishing functioning machineries of state in provinces such 
as the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga, both of which have been characterized 
by high levels of corruption and inefficiency, reflective of their incorporation 
of predecessor homeland administrations. Given the urgency of overcoming 
the divisions of South Africa’s „two economies”, one largely white and rich, 
the other largely black and poor and which continue to display urban/rural 
and regional dimensions, „development and delivery” is far more likely to be 
achieved through the control and guidance of a centralizing, technically profi-
cient elite than through the dispersal of power favoured by advocates of fed-
eralism. 
 Given the realities on the ground in the provinces, it is difficult to deny the 
power of this vision. Of course, its practical implementation encounters the con-
tinuing realities of huge shortages of skilled personpower and capacity at central 
state level. Nor can it be maintained that the ANC itself is a smoothly function-
ing and rational machinery, particularly in the wake of widespread allegations of 
corruption concerning the arms deal (notably involving Deputy President 
Zuma), resulting divisions between rival party factions at national level, and the 
prospect of a battle for the presidential succession that is looming prior to the 
next election.  Nonetheless, „dominant party” theorists will find it easier to find 
fault with the implementation  of the ANC’s self-image of its modernizing role 
than with the project itself.  
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The ANC as a site of struggle 
 
Dominant party theorists such as Giliomee and leftist critics of the ANC and 
Tripartite Alliance such as McKinley stress centralization of power within the 
party and the suppression of internal debate. My argument in this regard is that 
this element has been much exaggerated, and that the ANC must continue to be 
recognized as a „broad church”, which is composed of diverse elements (nation-
alists, Africanists, Marxists, careerists and so on), and as a party which continues 
to have strong internal democratic traditions, which constrain centralizing ten-
dencies. Suttner’s important current work upon the history of the ANC would 
also emphasise the party as an amalgam of a diversity of indigenous, modern, 
gendered and generational cultures.2 It is against this background that I have 
proposed previously that, in the absence of parliamentary opposition parties 
which are themselves heavily constrained either by their historical origins or 
their numerical weakness, key policy debates which take place in South Africa 
actually occur within the party and within the Tripartite Alliance, rather than 
outside the party in parliament (Southall 2003c).  
 This is not to deny that Giliomee and McKinley and others are correct to be 
concerned about various efforts to limit or silence debate which have been made 
by the party leadership through power and authority rather than through argu-
ment. Under both Mandela and Mbeki, these have often been phrased in terms 
of the delegitimisation of a so-called „ultra-left” which is deemed to have pene-
trated the Alliance. Nonetheless, COSATU in particular remains a constituency 
which has certain veto powers, and which the ANC leadership has to listen to. 
Of course, intra-party debate tends to die down during election campaigns; and 
intra-party debates, by their nature, exclude those who are outside the party. So 
they can only ever be a limited substitute for wider debate. Yet they are real, and 
they deny depiction of the ANC as monolithic. 
 
 
The ANC has limited capacity to impose itself upon society 
 
As noted above, South Africa is a complex society, with a relatively lively civil 
society, and has multiple cultural and regional traditions as well as a diverse 
economy. This truism invites reflection upon the outcome of the recent general 
elections:  
                                                 
2   The author has enjoyed a debate with Suttner over the characteristics of national libera-
tion movements (Suttner 2004b,c) and has benefited greatly from his on-going work on the 
diverse cultures of the ANC (e.g. Suttner 2004d). 
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•   As noted above, the 2004 general elections saw the ANC take nearly 70% 
of the vote for the National Assembly and capture control of all nine prov-
inces. In contrast, the opposition parties – with only minor exceptions – per-
formed badly. The DA, the official opposition, gained 400 000 votes and in-
creased its proportion of the total votes cast from 9.56% in 1999 to 12.37% in 
2004. However, this improvement was far less than it had anticipated, and 
was drawn overwhelmingly from a transfer of conservative white support 
from the formerly ruling New National Party (NNP) (whose vote collapsed 
from 6.86% of the poll in 1999 to a derisory 1.65% in 2004) rather than from 
black voters as the DA had hoped. Nor did the DA’s involvement in a so-
called „Coalition of Change” with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) assist its 
cause, for the latter lost both votes and control over KwaZulu-Natal. Despite 
much publicity given to the new Independent Democratic Party (ID) of Pa-
trica De Lille as a prospective new force, it took only 1.73% of the vote, and 
appears to have drawn heavily from her own Coloured community. Small 
gains in votes for other minor parties were cancelled out by losses to others. 
Overall, therefore, the opposition parties remain as fragmented (along racial, 
ethnic and regional lines) as ever, although since the election the leader of the 
NNP has accepted a post in government and has announced the future 
merger of his party into the ANC. 
•   However, observers are convinced that the ANC cannot live on the „libera-
tion dividend” for ever. As time wears on, the ANC will become increasingly 
vulnerable to attacks on issues, notably HIV/AIDS, growing unemployment 
and delivery deficits (Daniel 2004). „Identity voting” may give way to „issue 
voting” (or ANC voters may orient themselves to alternative identities). 
 
•   There is some considerable suggestion of voter alienation resulting from 
party dominance. The ANC’s proportion of the vote may have increased, but 
it did so in the context of a lower voter turnout (75.5% in 2004 compared with 
87.1% in 1999) and the failure to register as voters of 6.76 million eligible per-
sons, a particularly large proportion of whom would appear to be potential 
first-time voters. Overall, survey evidence indicates variously: deep distrust 
amongst the population of politicians, a widespread sense amongst opposi-
tion voters that they cannot influence government, and a feeling amongst the 
youth that the political parties do not represent their interests.3 Meanwhile, 
there is a wider view that the ANC is committed to particular constituencies 
(e.g. business and labour) and ignores other interests. Hence there is the pros-
pect that the weight of opposition may shift to social movements outside 
parliament.  
 
                                                 
3   This is born out by the South African Social Attitudes Survey, conducted in October 2003, 
which is presently being processed by the Human Sciences Research Council. 
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•   There has already been much speculation and argument that South Africa 
will only have an alternative government if the Tripartite Alliance breaks up 
and COSATU and the SACP form a party of the left (Habib and Taylor 2001). 
The counter-argument is that, even if this would bedesirable, it is unrealistic 
to expect it to happen in the foreseeable future. A survey recently conducted 
amongst members of COSATU indicates no decrease in the level of their sup-
port for the ANC as compared with that given in both 1994 and 1999,4 and 
confirms analysis that – whatever policy differences the trade union move-
ment may have with the ruling party – it represents the interests of workers 
who are employed in the „core” economy, and who are relatively advantaged 
vis-à-vis the informally employed. Consequently, it is much more likely that 
serious opposition to government will occur from organizations mobilizing 
around particular causes, of which the Treatment Action Campaign, which 
fights on behalf of those with HIV/AIDS, is the forerunner, and from resis-
tance organizations of the poor and dispossessed, based in the townships 
which the NP was able to control in the 1980s only with the assistance of the 
military, around service issues like electricity and water cut-offs, school fees, 
and so on. However, the political forms which such initiatives might take, and 
the strategies which they might adopt, remain to be seen, and it cannot be 
assumed that they will take the form of a political party seeking to displace 
the ANC. Indeed, it is equally likely that such discontents will themselves 
feed into the party and the Tripartite Alliance, and render them more diverse 
than they are at the moment. We may yet see the paradox that the more 
dominant the ANC is electorally, the more factionalised it may become politi-
cally. 
 These trends  are likely to shift the sands of South African politics, and to 
challenge or change the shape of the „dominance” of the ANC over the next 
decade or so. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that, however much it may distress the ANC, the domi-
nant party thesis is too important, and indeed too insightful, to be dismissed out 
of hand. It addresses major issues concerning democratic consolidation, notably 
concerning the tendency for dominant parties to become more illiberal the more 
they become entrenched. Its particular strength, in the South African context, has 
                                                 
4   The survey, presently being written up, was undertaken by the Sociology of Work Unit of 
the University of the Witwatersrand and the Democracy and Governance Research Pro-
gramme of the Human Sciences Research Council. Support for the ANC amongst COSATU 
workers stood at 73% in 2004 compared to 75% in both 1994 and 1998 (as found in predeces-
sor surveys). 
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to be the way in which the ANC has set about the delegitimisation of the DA, 
which it consistently demonises as racist, Eurocentric and unpatriotic.5 Against 
this, few unbiased observers would deny that, for all its limitations and inability 
to pull much support from beyond the white community, it is the DA which has 
been far the most effective opposition body in rendering the ANC publicly ac-
countable, most especially over issues of corruption. From this perspective, it has 
to be said that the ANC’s refusal to engage with the dilemmas for democracy 
posed by its dominance, and the lack of an alternative government, is particu-
larly worrying. 
 The argument here is not that the dominant party thesis is „wrong”, but that 
is has been overstated by its principal proponents, who have tended to portray 
the ANC as a behometh intent upon extinguishing democratic (especially minor-
ity) rights which are embodied in the constitution. In repudiating this implica-
tion, its defenders like Suttner (2004b) are correct to riposte that it has been the 
ANC which has been the harbinger of democracy in South Africa, and which is 
primarily responsible for the human rights based nature of the constitution. Its 
dominance indicates its continuing popularity, largely amongst the majority of 
South Africans who historically were subject to racial oppression. And as 
Piombo (2005) stresses – upon the basis of collective study of the recent election – 
this in turn is a product of continuing hard work and campaigning, as the ANC 
has actively sought to avoid the atrophy and fracturing of the party which has 
afflicted other liberation movements in Africa following their movement into 
power after independence. Meanwhile, there are those who propose that only a 
dominant party with the moral authority and hegemony possessed by the ANC 
could have hoped to lead South Africa out of the dire circumstances of pre-1994 
to a newly democratic dispensation (Brooks 2004:19), even if recurrent victories 
at the polls and the extension of the ANC’s control over the entire state appara-
tus are very likely to lead to greater arrogance, despite recent post-election pleas 
by Mbeki for humility. Nonetheless, the ANC’s domination of society may be far 
less secure than appears in the wake of the recent election victory, for an emer-
gent authoritarianism will have to override not merely constitutional constraints 
and internal party diversity, but societal discontents that are likely to arise out of 
failures of the ANC’s performance in government to meet the aspirations of a 
larger, more youthful population in an increasingly globalised world. ANC 
dominance, in short, is not static, and is likely to undergo considerable challenge 
over coming years. 
 
 
                                                 
5   „The April election witnessed an effusion of anti-DA venom which went well beyond 
robust electioneering to suggest a coordinated campaign to demonise and delegitimise. The 
charge of racism was repeatedly levelled, embellished with attempts to portray Leon as a 
latter-day Josef Goebbels.” (Forrest 2004). 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die andauernde Debatte über die Frage, ob der African National Congress (ANC) 
als sogenannte „Dominante Partei” bezeichnet werden kann oder sollte, wurde 
durch die Diskussion zwischen den führenden politischen Parteien des Landes 
während der landesweiten Wahlen 2004 illustriert. Der ANC, der seine Hegemo-
nie als Ausdruck seiner Popularität sieht, lehnt seine Charakterisierung als „Do-
minante Partei” als inhärent feindselig, konservativ und rassistisch ab. Im Gegen-
satz dazu warnen die Democratic Alliance (DA) und ihr nahestehende Analysten 
vor Gefahren für die Demokratie, die verursacht würden durch die Arroganz des 
ANC, seine Freiheit von Verantwortlichkeit und seine Ambitionen, die erweiterte 
Kontrolle in Staat und Gesellschaft auszubauen. Nach einem Überblick über die 
Kerngedanken der Debatte zeigt der vorliegende Artikel auf, dass die Kontrahen-
ten ihre Argumente jeweils übertreiben. Unter Anerkennung der Tatsache, dass 
der Wahlsieg und die politische Hegemonie des ANC Gefahren für die Demokra-
tie darstellen, stellt der Artikel im Gegensatz die These auf, dass die Fähigkeit des 
ANC seine Dominanz zu erweitern, erheblichen Beschränkungen unterliegt. Die-
ses Argument wird gestützt durch Analysefaktoren, wie die Multidimensionalität 
der Parteien-Dominanz, die Einschränkungen der Versuche des ANC Macht 
durch konstitutionelle, politische und ökonomische Realitäten einschränken zu 
zentralisieren, die Aufrechterhaltung der Debatte innerhalb des ANC und zwi-
schen ihm und ihm grundsätzlich verbundenen Organisationen, und schließlich 
die Schwierigkeiten, mit denen der ANC konfrontiert wird, beim Versuch, seine 
Autorität einer Gesellschaft, die so komplex ist wie Südafrika, aufzuzwingen. 
 Die Schlussfolgerung lautet, dass die These von der „Dominanten Partei”, 
zu bedeutend und zu aufschlussreich ist, um sie fallen zu lassen, auch wenn sie 
oft übertrieben wird. Sorgfältige Analysen legen nahe, dass die Grundlage der 
ANC-Dominanz weit davon entfernt ist, statisch zu sein, und im übrigen in kom-
menden Jahren erheblichen Herausforderungen unterworfen sein wird. 
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Résumé 
 
Le débat persistant sur la question de savoir si l’African National Congress (ANC) 
peut ou devrait être qualifié de „parti dominant” a été illustré par les discussions 
entre les grands partis politiques du pays lors des élections nationales de 2004. 
L’ANC qui voit dans son hégémonie, l’expression de sa popularité, réfute la dé-
nomination de „parti dominant” comme intrinsèquement hostile, conservatrice et 
raciste. A l’opposé de cela , la Democratic Alliance (DA) et ses proches analystes 
mettent en garde contre les dangers pour la démocratie qui seraient causés par 
l’arrogance de l’ANC, par sa grande liberté dans la prise de responsabilité et ses 
ambitions d’étendre toujours plus son contrôle sur l’Etat et la société.  
 Après un survol des idées centrales de ce débat, le présent article montre 
que les différents protagonistes exagèrent de part et d’autre leurs arguments. Tout 
en reconnaissant que les victoires électorales et l’hégémonie politique de l’ANC 
puissent comporter des dangers pour la démocratie, l’article soutient néanmoins 
la thèse que la capacité de l’ANC à étendre sa dominance fait l’objet de limitations 
considérables. Cet argument s’appuie sur l’analyse de facteurs comme le caractère 
multidimensionnel de la dominance d’un parti, les limites posées aux tentatives 
de l’ANC de centraliser le pouvoir par les réalités constitutionnelles, politiques et 
économiques, la persistance de débats au sein de l’ANC et entre celui-ci et ses 
proches organisations et finalement les difficultés auxquelles l’ANC est confronté 
dans sa tentative d’imposer son autorité à une société si complexe que celle de 
l’Afrique du Sud. 
 En conclusion, l’auteur affirme que la thèse du „parti dominant” est trop 
importante et instructive pour être abandonnée même si elle est souvent exagérée. 
Des analyses précises montrent que le fondement de la dominance de l’ANC est 
loin d’être statique et sera en outre soumise à des défis considérables dans les 
années à venir. 
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liance (South Africa), pouvoir politique, élection/vote, transition entre systèmes politiques 
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